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On April 17, 2017, Terry Branstad, the governor of Iowa (now ambassador to China), signed into legislation, language that eliminated the Leopold Center for Sustainable Agriculture. Only the name survived to protect a large endowment. Coincidentally, Gov. Branstad signed the legislation establishing the center almost 30 years earlier. Elimination of the Center, loss of its space and firing of the staff except for two tenured administrators, shut down an institution we had built, with the help of farmers, faculty, professionals, and students; an institution that was the pride of Iowa. I feel this loss deeply.

Why Did This Happen?
The closing of the Leopold Center was political. Conventional wisdom is that the legislation that led to its demise was advanced by agribusiness and chemical interests in Iowa. These same interests strongly opposed establishment of the Center in 1987. This article tells the story about how the Leopold Center was able to advance the cause of sustainable agriculture during its 30 years.

Beginnings of Sustainability Discussions
The concept of sustainability was first introduced into common thought by the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. Delegates recognized the conflict between economic development based upon sustained growth and the environmental threats that accompany it, including global climate change. In 1984, the U.N. established the Brundtland Commission which sought creation of an organization independent of the U.N. to foster a united international community with shared sustainability goals. Their findings appeared in the publication “Our Common Future.” The first volume was published in 1987. It was widely cited and criticized.

The commission defined sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” This is the most widely accepted definition of sustainability. This definition has been widely debated and remains controversial today.

There are three pillars of sustainable development:
• Economic growth
• Environmental protection
• Social equity

These pillars overlap, are global in scope, and must be considered together. The commission reports formed the basis of the 1992 and 2002 Earth Summits. Much of the early discussion leading to the commission’s
findings was based upon the food needs of poor countries. Thus, agriculture was central to the debates.

The sustainability concept, while generally accepted in the 1980’s, was found difficult to implement. The economics did not fit in with the Reagan-Thatcher neo-liberal economic concepts adopted by many Western nations. Many industries, including agriculture, saw sustainable agriculture as undermining their bottom line. Environmental concerns such as water quality and global warming did not concern agriculturalists who did not believe the concerns of environmentalists. Rich and poor countries had different developmental goals. It was far easier to delay the food debate by “feed the world” slogans that were applied to rich countries as they continued their extractive ways of farming. An example were the bitter arguments between Norman Borlaug and African agricultural NGO leaders over organic versus conventional Western agriculture in African food production.

The Battle Lines were Drawn

Many Iowa political and farming leaders were following the international debates with increasing interest and some were convinced that Iowa was following a growth pattern that was not sustainable. Soil loss was increasing, farmers were leaving the land, animal waste pollution was increasing, and widespread tillage and fertilizer overuse (using recommendations provided by Iowa State University) were adding to the nitrogen and phosphorus content of drainage waters. About 13 million of Iowa’s 30 million farming acres were tiled. Over half of Iowa’s land is in corn, a highly erosive crop with high fertilizer and energy demands. The other half is in soybeans, another highly erosive crop. Today, close to half of this corn goes into ethanol production. Much of the remainder is fed to swine and chickens. So much for feeding the world. Estimates of soil loss exceeded 20 tons per acre per year on many soils, greatly exceeding the “sustainable” loss rate of 5 tons per acre. Soil quality continued to degrade because the two-crop rotation gave little opportunity for the soil to recover.

Drainage tiles along with diesel power and fertilizers (particularly nitrogen, produced by former WWII explosive factories) and pesticides (derived from the nerve gas poisons of WWII), set Iowa up to be one of the world’s powerhouses in grain and meat production. Over the years, rules and regulations were established to encourage industrial approaches to animal and grain agriculture. Each “advance” led to increased farm size with
subsequent decline of farmer numbers, biodiversity, communities, and farmer control over their operations. It also increased the pollution of Iowa’s lakes and streams to the point where most are now classed as degraded.

Clearly this was not a sustainable path for Iowa but state leaders were unable to see beyond the horizon and the state continued its trend to industrial agriculture. When I opened the doors on the Leopold Center in 1988, I knew what lay ahead — I had enough experience nationally pushing uphill on sustainable agriculture to know that industry was vehemently opposed. It was mostly on philosophical grounds; reason played little role in this opposition.

The elephant in the room was “organic,” and fears were stoked by industry that organics would take away their lucrative chemical markets. Common sense said otherwise. Another elephant in the room was fear of government meddling in farming. This has been a constant fear, first stoked by Barry Commoner’s findings in the early 1970’s that fertilizers provided up to half of the nitrate in the rivers of central Illinois. As reported in the respected journal Science, Commoner had proposed limiting fertilizer applications.

The findings were unambiguous. Nitrate in drinking water was a health threat to infants and the 10 mg per liter health limit was supported by science. Scientists now recognize that nitrate also is a key causative contributor to hypoxia – the overproduction of algae in shallow Gulf of Mexico waters that asphyxiate fish and shellfish.

The major source of nitrate in most ecosystems is agriculture (a fact still widely disbelieved in traditional agriculture circles). The ensuing debate on government intervention resulted in agricultural scientists and administrators avoiding the issue, a common approach. Agricultural industry denounced these findings, threatened agricultural colleges with defunding and influenced the research agendas of researchers.

The issue arose recently right in the Leopold Center’s front yard when the Des Moines Water Works sued the Water Drainage Districts of three counties claiming the districts did not provide drainage water conforming to the health limits for nitrate and that they should either pay damages or work to improve management of farms to provide such water. Rather than sitting down with the city, the agriculturalists mounted major public relations campaigns claiming they were not at fault, while preparing for a lengthy court battle. Industry money poured in and overwhelmed the financial resources of the City of Des Moines.

In the end, the Federal District Court judge ruled that the Water Works could not sue the Drainage Districts. The ruling was technical, and widely accepted. Still, a typical headline announcing the case decision stated, “Farmers Won.” No one won, and today hog lots are rapidly expanding, taking advantage of a political decision of several years ago that hog lots of less than 7,500 head in size need less environmental assessment and may be built without consideration of who may be living downwind or downstream.

In the meantime, Iowa has adopted what is vaguely described as a “nutrient management plan.” It calls for voluntary adoption of management practices that will lessen the rate of nitrate and phosphorus runoff and drainage from farmland. This plan, written largely by industry in cooperation with University Extension, has little hope of achieving true success (e.g., permanent nutrient reduction) because it is voluntary, site-based and not subsidized. Recent discharge measurements have indicated that the plan has had no effect to date. In fact, by some estimates nitrate discharge has increased nearly 50% since its adoption.

Leopold’s Work is Completed?

Why would the most predominantly agricultural state in the nation want to throw away an institution such as the Leopold Center? The Center had been meeting its legislative mandate for nearly 30 years, had developed close ties with Extension and the farming community, and had sponsored hundreds of small and large projects that pertained to social and technical aspects of sustainable agriculture. Many technologies were developed that
pertained to reducing chemical use and controlling soil and water erosion, many being adapted to the needs of farmers on smaller acreages.

In defending the bill eliminating the Leopold Center, legislators argued that the Center had completed its work. They also said the Center was supposed to be self-funded by now (not true) and that it can now operate with funds from the industry. Obviously this is not possible — industry funding has always led to research in the interest of the industry. Why would it ever be otherwise?

While we rightly worry about water quality and quantity, I continue to be very concerned about the less glamorous soil erosion and degradation. Soil is our foundation, the source of the world’s food and protector of the environment. But maybe my objectivity is being affected by my appreciation and understanding of soils.

Iowa does have a problem — well many problems actually, most of its own making. I am referring to a huge environmental problem of muddy streams and lakes, polluted not only with fragile topsoil but also with nutrients and pesticides. And Iowa is beginning to recognize it. This mess was many years in the making and it will take a long time and a lot of changes in lifestyle and farm practice to correct the course. Will correction be possible? More than 85% of Iowa’s land is farmed, more than any other equivalent political area in the world. This cropland is mostly highly productive, especially of the grain crops – primarily corn and soybeans.

Commonly called “Big Ag,” we are referring to the industrial complex that controls the stuff it takes to farm: the chemicals, machinery, land, money, legislation for subsidies and rules – in other words everything agriculture. Big Ag is the corporate phase of agriculture that ends up treating farmers as willing workers, or “serfs.” It only gives lip service to environmental protection of the resources upon which it depends.

Big Ag fights any attempt to control its agenda, particularly keeping legislation setting rules and standards away from its doorstep. I believe that it surmised that closing the Leopold Center would be to its benefit. I predict they are dead wrong.

Agriculture is the largest unregulated industry in the U.S. Yet, if any industry needs regulating, it is agriculture. Soil destruction, massive animal-confined operations that foul the air and the streams, as well as diminished sources of employment, and large-scale crop growing techniques that add nitrate, sediment and pesticides to surface and ground waters mark the way most of Iowa farms.

Farming is using up its resources faster than they are being replaced; it is not sustainable.

Scientists first recognized that natural resource sustainability was important with the advanced thinking and writing of Aldo Leopold and his Sand County Almanac and Rachael Carlson’s Silent Spring. Leopold especially realized the loss of soil through erosion and over-farming was impacting ecosystems throughout the world while Carlson worried about the impact of pesticides.

Even back then, Big Ag fought back with words and deeds. And it decided that its potentially greatest ally was the university, especially America’s prestigious Land Grant centers of learning.

It was important for Big Ag not only to stifle innovation and imaginative thought and discussion but also to channel this energy into creating products and students that are needed by industries. Over time this became the modus operandi; cut the state and federal government’s portion of the university’s budget and rely on industrial grants and contracts for more and more of the day-to-day support and research.
While “publish or perish” used to be the battle cry for embattled professors, it is now replaced with “get grants, then publish or perish.” The new reality is that without outside money, research careers are stalled, university mega-research complexes are under-funded, and administrators go shopping for new jobs.

This situation sets the stage for control of agriculture by the industry and the development of Big Ag. It can be subtle or direct but to be sure, industry will not put out the type of funding needed to do long-term, big-picture research that Leopold- or Carson-type programs would call for. Thus, the “Big Science” that has developed parallel with Big Ag also spends much of its energy on narrow focused projects.

An enlightened group of Iowa legislators in the mid-1980’s realized the troubles Iowa was having in its agricultural sector. Both nitrate and pesticides were finding their way into Iowa waters with increasing frequency. Farmers were having difficulty making ends meet and many were going broke, farms had gotten too large to control and land prices were plummeting, wiping out the equity farmers needed to pay their pricey loans. Suicides were common.

Iowa always seems short of money because of the current “farm crisis.” In 1985 the legislators began debating the need for a new approach to agricultural research, education and outreach. It was to be called the Leopold Center for Sustainable Agriculture. It was to be placed at Iowa State University but have responsibilities at the state’s other universities, work directly with University Extension and fund projects that look at problems and solutions to Iowa agriculture sustainability.

It was to be funded by monies from the state general fund and from a unique “polluter pays” tax on fertilizers and pesticides. This source of funds created a furor. Big Ag had major concerns that they were paying for their own demise, organic agriculture would be promoted, fertilizer use would plummet, and regulations would abound. But the bill passed and was signed. The wounds, however, never healed.

In 2017 the political winds shifted. The legislature and governor’s office shared a political ideology, and environmental and sustainable agriculture was no longer a favored program. As a legislator said, “the mission has been accomplished.” Iowa was facing major budget deficits. The budget was “balanced” by shutting down or trimming state programs. The Leopold Center was a casualty of this process.

This is where the Center stands today. Some environmental and sustainable farm groups have been holding meetings to redefine the Center and raise money. But funding is a major problem. The original funding was about $1.5 million a year from the tax on nitrogen fertilizer and pesticides. That money was repurposed. An equal amount was obtained annually through grants and contracts but the stable funding will be almost impossible to replace in the foreseeable future in a state as solidly conservative as Iowa has become.

This sad outcome has cost Iowa much credibility in the agricultural and environmental circles around the country. Add to this the knowledge that Iowa now has some of the poorest quality water and highest rates of soil erosion in the country. This reality will be a major negative for its future, especially in attracting the dynamic young leaders needed to make it thrive.

**Continuing the Work**

Our experience in Iowa provides lessons for the future. Sustainable agricultural practice should be developed, implemented and embraced. Perhaps Iowa does not have the institutions in place to support research for sustainable practices?

Where should sustainable agricultural practices be developed and implemented? Today, conservation science and sustainable practice seem to be the province of public interest groups and progressive research organizations. Although many universities have become research vendors for commercial interests, and thus not
attracting candidates for research supporting sustainable practices, it may be the case that some universities in the upper Midwest or on the East and West coasts could be fertile fields.

How can development of sustainable agricultural practices be funded? A difficult challenge. Looking to agribusiness is problematic. State support in the Midwest also presents challenges. The federal government has been a source of research leadership in times past. Recently, nearly every role of government is being questioned. The federal government may not be a reliable partner. So, public interest groups and foundations, and possibly progressive states might be able to contribute.

I see the need for a major philanthropic person or foundation to step in and fill the gap. The Leopold Center, to continue to succeed, needs independence from Iowa State University, which it had with the funds from the fertilizer and pesticide tax. Yet, it needs ISU as a cooperative partner in research projects and in fiscal management.

The Center proudly proved the concepts it espoused. To shut it down now is a loss to society.

**Additional Reading about the Leopold Center Controversy:**

State Legislators Say Iowa Has Achieved Sustainable Farming (It Hasn’t) and Doesn’t Need More Research (It Does)  

Obradovich: GOP wants businesses to control environmental research  

Rethink This Iowa: Do Not Gut the Leopold Center for Sustainable Agriculture  

Taking Action for Public Science: Re-Imagining Iowa’s Leopold Center for Sustainable Agriculture  
Environmental Impacts of the Deep-Water Oil and Gas Industry

Erik E. Cordes et al.

The industrialization of the deep sea is expanding worldwide. Increasing oil and gas exploration activities in the absence of sufficient baseline data in deep-sea ecosystems has made environmental management challenging. The following report excerpt reviews the types of activities that are associated with global offshore oil and gas development in water depths over 200 m, the typical impacts of these activities, and some of the more extreme impacts of accidental oil and gas releases.

Effects of Routine Activities

Routine oil and gas activities can have detrimental environmental effects during each of the main phases of exploration, production, and decommissioning (Figure 1). During the exploration phase, impacts can result from indirect (sound and traffic) and direct physical (anchor chains, drill cuttings, and drilling fluids) disturbance. Additional direct physical impacts occur in the production phase as pipelines are laid and the volume of discharged produced water increases. Lastly, decommissioning can result in a series of direct impacts on the sea floor and can re-introduce contaminants to the environment. It is critical that all of the potential impacts of routine operations are accounted for when designing management strategies, whether local or regional, for offshore oil and gas activities.

Impacts from deep-water oil and gas development activities begin during seismic surveys that are used to reveal the subsurface geology and locate potential reservoirs. These impacts include underwater sound and light emissions and increased vessel activity. Sound levels produced during seismic surveys vary in intensity, but in some cases, soundwaves from these surveys have been detected almost 4000 km away from the survey vessel (Nieuwkerk et al., 2012). Impact assessments of acoustic disturbance have primarily focused on marine mammals. Reported effects include disruption of behavior (e.g., feeding, breeding, resting, migration), masking of sounds used for communication and navigation, localized displacement, physiological stress, as well as physical injury including temporary or permanent hearing damage (Gordon et al., 2004; Southall et al., 2008; Moore et al., 2012). Marine mammal exposure experiments and noise propagation modeling suggest that hearing damage may occur within a few 100 m to km from the sound source, with avoidance behaviors more variable but generally detected over greater distances (Southall et al., 2008). In contrast, the potential effects of sound on fish and invertebrates...

Figure 1. Diagram of impacts from typical deep-sea drilling activity
remain poorly understood, but may be significant (Hawkins et al., 2014). For example, significant developmental delays and body malformations have been recorded in scallop larvae exposed to seismic pulses (de Soto et al., 2013). Exposure to underwater broadband sound fields that resemble offshore shipping and construction activity can also influence the activity and behavior of key bioturbating species in sediments (Solan et al., 2016).

Operations at oil fields introduce considerable amounts of artificial light (e.g., electric lighting, gas flares) that can potentially affect ecological processes in the upper ocean, such as diel vertical migration of plankton (Moore et al., 2000). Artificial night light also attracts numerous species, including squid, large predatory fishes, and birds (Longcore and Rich, 2004). Underwater lighting, such as used on remotely operated vehicles, is likely to be of comparatively modest impact, though it may be significant in the case of species with extremely sensitive visual systems (Herring et al., 1999).

Once the installation of infrastructure commences, direct impacts on habitats and associated fauna increase. Placement of infrastructure on the seafloor, such as anchors and pipelines, will directly disturb the seabed and cause a transient increase in local sedimentation. Typically, 8–12 anchors are used to moor a semi-submersible drilling rig. The spatial extent of anchor impacts on the seabed varies depending on operating depth, but is typically between 1.5 and 2.5 times the water depth of the operation (Vryhof Anchors BV, 2010). As anchors are set, they are dragged along the seabed, damaging benthic organisms and leaving an anchor scar on the seafloor. The impact of anchors in the deep sea is of greatest concern in biogenic habitats, such as those formed by corals and sponges, which are fragile and have low resilience to physical forces (Hall-SPencer et al., 2002; Watling, 2014). Anchor operations have been shown to impact coral communities directly through physical disturbance and increased local sedimentation, with an estimated 100 m wide corridor of influence (Ulfnses et al., 2013). The laying of pipelines also alters local seabed habitat conditions by adding hard substratum, which in turn may support sessile epifauna and/or attract motile benthic organisms (Lebrato and Jones, 2009). Ulfnses et al. (2013) estimated a 50 m wide corridor of impact for pipeline installations, including dislocation of existing hard substrata. Corrosion and leakage of pipelines also poses the risk of exposing deep-sea fauna to potentially damaging pollution.

The drilling process involves the disposal of waste, including drill cuttings and excess cement, fluids (drilling mud), produced water, and other chemicals that may cause detrimental ecological effects (Gray et al., 1990). Drill cuttings are the fragments of rock that are created during the drilling process. The chemical composition of drilling muds is diverse, and has changed from the more toxic oil-based muds (currently restricted in many jurisdictions) to more modern synthetic and water-based fluids. The types of fluids most commonly used currently are generally regarded to be less toxic than oil-based fluids, but they are not without adverse biological effects (Daan and Mulder, 1996; Breuer et al., 2004; Bakhtyar and Gagnon, 2012; Gagnon and Bakhtyar, 2013; Edge et al., 2016). Produced water is contaminated water associated with oil and gas extraction process, with an estimated global production ratio of 3:1 water:oil over the lifetime of a well (Khatib and Verbeek, 2002; Neff, 2002; Fakhru’l-Razi et al., 2009). However, it should be noted that this is a global average, and these estimates vary greatly between hydrocarbon fields with the ratio of water to oil increasing over the lifetime of a single well. Produced water is primarily composed of formation water extracted during oil and gas recovery, but may also contain seawater that has previously been injected into the reservoir along with dissolved inorganic salts, dissolved and dispersed hydrocarbons, dissolved minerals, trace metals, naturally occurring radioactive substances, production chemicals, and dissolved gases (Hansen and Davies, 1994; Neff, 2002; Fakhru’l-Razi et al., 2009; Bakke et al., 2013). As a major source of contaminants from oil and gas extraction activity, produced water is typically treated in accordance with strict regulations before being discharged (e.g., OSPAR, 2001).

The spatial footprint of discharge varies with the volume of discharge, depth of discharge, local hydrography, particle size distribution, rates of settlement and floc formation, and time since discharge (Neff, 2005; Niu et al., 2009). Although volumes are likely to vary greatly depending on the local conditions during the active stage of drilling, discharges from one deep-water well at 900 m depth off the coast of Brazil were ~270 m³ of cuttings, 320 m³ of water-based fluids, and 70 m³ of non-aqueous fluids (Pivel et al., 2009). These types of discharges may produce cuttings accumulations up to 20 m in thickness within 100–500 m of the well site (Breuer et al., 2004; Jones et al., 2006; Pivel et al., 2009). Visual assessment at 10 recent deep-water well sites between 370
and 1750 m depth, drilled using current best practice in the NE Atlantic, recorded visual cuttings accumulations present over a radius of 50–150 m from the well head (Jones and Gates, 2010).

Potential impacts on seabed communities can result from both the chemical toxicants and the physical disturbance. Reduction in oxygen concentration, organic enrichment, increased hydrocarbon concentrations, and increased metal abundance can alter biogeochemical processes and generate hydrogen sulfide and ammonia (Neff, 2002). At present, little information is available on the effects of these processes at the microbial level. At the metazoan level, community-level changes in the density, biomass, and diversity of protistan, meio-, macro-, and megafaunal assemblages have been recorded in several studies (Gray et al., 1990; Currie and Isaacs, 2005; Jones et al., 2007; Netto et al., 2009; Santos et al., 2009; Lanzen et al., 2016). These changes have been linked with smothering by drilling cuttings and increased concentrations of harmful metals (e.g., barium) and hydrocarbons (Holdway, 2002; Breuer et al., 2004; Santos et al., 2009; Trannum et al., 2010).

Detected ecological changes attributed to current practices have typically been found within 200–300 m of the well-head (Currie and Isaacs, 2005; Gates and Jones, 2012), but can occasionally extend to 1–2 km for sensitive species (Paine et al., 2014). Previous drilling practices, where oil-based drilling muds were used for the entire drilling process (use of such methods are currently heavily regulated in most jurisdictions), appeared to generate benthic impacts to >5 km from the discharge point (Olsgard and Gray, 1995). More recent evidence based on current drilling techniques suggests that the effects of produced water on benthic organisms will be limited to 1–2 km from the source (Bakke et al., 2013). Seafloor coverage of drill cuttings as low as 3 mm thickness can generate detectable impacts to the infauna (Schaanning et al., 2008). However, even beyond the area of observable cuttings piles, quantitative changes in meiofaunal abundance and community composition have been observed (Montagna and Harper, 1996; Netto et al., 2009). Changes in assemblage structure have also been observed beyond the areas of visually apparent seafloor disturbance as a result of increased scavenging and opportunistic feeding on dead animals (Jones et al., 2007; Hughes et al., 2010). Despite occasional observations of increased scavenger abundance in impacted areas, it has been suggested that the fauna of cuttings-contaminated sediments represent a reduced food resource for fish populations (e.g., smaller body size, loss of epifaunal species, shift from ophiuroids to polychaetes; Olsgard and Gray, 1995).

Cold-water corals (Figure 2) have been the focus of numerous impact studies. Discharges from typical operations have the potential to impact cold-water coral communities in deep waters through smothering and toxic effects (Lepland and Mortensen, 2008; Purser and Thomsen, 2012; Larsson et al., 2013). In laboratory studies, the reef-framework-forming stony coral Lophelia pertusa had significant polyp mortality following burial by 6.5 mm of drill cuttings, the maximum permissible under environmental risk assessment in Norway (Larsson and Purser, 2011). As a result, at the Morvin field in Norway, where drilling took place near a Lophelia reef, a novel cuttings-transport system was developed to discharge cuttings some 500 m from the well and down-current from the most significant coral reefs (Purser, 2015). The discharge location was determined to minimize impacts based on cuttings dispersion simulation modeling (Reed and Hetland, 2002). Subsequent monitoring at nine reefs between 100 m and 2 km from the discharge site suggested this mitigation measure appeared to have been generally successful. Although concentrations of drill cuttings >25 ppm were observed at several of the monitored reefs, no obvious visual impacts to the coral communities were reported (Purser, 2015). However, this concentration of drill cuttings had been shown to have a significant negative effect on L. pertusa growth in laboratory experiments (Larsson et al., 2013).

Impacts from oil and gas operations may be compounded in some settings by other anthropogenic disturbances, particularly as human impacts on the deep-sea environment continue to increase (e.g., Glover and Smith, 2003; Ramirez-Llodra et al., 2011; Kark et al., 2015). Climate and ocean change, including higher temperatures, expansion of oxygen minimum zones, and ocean acidification, will exacerbate the more direct impacts of the oil and gas industry through increased metabolic demand. Multiple stressors can operate as additive effects, synergistic effects, or antagonistic effects (Crain et al., 2008). While studies of the interactions between climate variables (temperature, oxygen, pH, CO₂) and drilling impacts are rare or non-existent, multiple stressors typically have antagonistic effects at the community level, but synergistic effects at the population level (Crain et
al., 2008). At the most basic level, experimental work has shown that increased temperature generally increases the toxicity of petroleum hydrocarbons and other compounds (Cairns et al., 1975; Tatem et al., 1978), which suggests that the ecological impacts that have been recorded to date may expand in magnitude and distance as climate change proceeds.

Deep-water fisheries have a significant impact on deep-sea species, with detrimental effects extending to habitats and ecosystems beyond the target populations (Benn et al., 2010; Clark et al., 2016). Some authors note that the physical presence of oil and gas infrastructure may protect fished species or habitats by de facto creating fisheries exclusion zones (Hall, 2001; Love et al., 2006), by establishing new reef habitat (sensu Montagna et al., 2002), and by functioning as fish aggregating devices (Hinck et al., 2004). Although the value of oil and gas infrastructure in secondary production and fisheries, particularly in deep waters, is controversial (Bohnsack, 1989; Baine, 2002; Ponti, 2002; Powers et al., 2003; Fabi et al., 2004; Kaiser and Pulsipher, 2006), there is some evidence to suggest that this can occur (Claisse et al., 2015). Oil industry infrastructure may therefore have some positive effects, even in deep water (Macreadie et al., 2011), principally in terms of creating refugia from fishing impacts (e.g., Wilson et al., 2002).

Oil-field infrastructure can also provide hard substratum for colonization by benthic invertebrates, including scleractinian corals and octocorals (Hall, 2001; Sammarco et al., 2004; Gass and Roberts, 2006; Larcom et al., 2014). The widely-distributed coral *L. pertusa* (Figure 2) has been recorded on numerous oil field structures in the northern North Sea (Bell and Smith, 1999; Gass and Roberts, 2006), as well as on infrastructure in the Faroe-Shetland Channel (Hughes, 2011), and the northern Gulf of Mexico (Larcom et al., 2014). These man-made structures may enhance population connectivity (Atchison et al., 2008) and provide stepping stones for both native and potentially invasive species, which has been demonstrated for shallow-water species that may not normally be able to disperse across large expanses of open water (Page et al., 2006; Coutts and Dodgshun, 2007; Sheehy and Vik, 2010). Therefore, the increased connectivity provided by these artificial structures may be viewed both positively and negatively, and it is difficult to make predictions about the potential benefits or harm of the increased availability of deep-sea hard substrata.

Figure 2. Deep-sea communities near drilling activities. (A) Benthic communities shortly after smothering by (light colored) cuttings at the Tornado Field (1050 m depth), Faroe-Shetland Channel, U.K. (B) Edge of cuttings pile at the Laggan field, Faroe-Shetland Channel, U.K. (Figure 4D from Jones et al., 2012a). (C) Atlantic roughy, Hoplostethus occidentalis, among L. pertusa around the abandoned test-pile near Zinc at 450 m depth in the Gulf of Mexico. Image courtesy of the Lophelia II program, U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy and Management and NOAA Office of Ocean Exploration and Research. (D) Appearance in 2013 of a Paramuricea bisscaya colony damaged during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010. Image courtesy of ECOGIG, a GoMRI-funded research consortium and the Ocean Exploration Trust. (E,F): Methane-seep communities from an area within the exclusive economic zone of Trinidad and Tobago that is targeted for future oil and gas development. The Ocean Exploration Trust is acknowledged for use of these photos from the E/V Nautilus 2014 Expedition.
Effects of Accidental Discharges

Oil and gas operations have the potential to result in accidental releases of hydrocarbons, with the likelihood of an accidental spill or blowout increasing with the depth of the operations (Muehlenbachs et al., 2013). The U.S. NOAA Office of Response and Restoration records, on average, 1–3 spills per week within the U.S. EEZ, but most of these are relatively small and occur near the shore. On the U.S. outer continental shelf between 1971 and 2010, there were 23 large spills of more than 1000 barrels (160,000 L) of oil, or an average of one every 21 months (Anderson et al., 2012). In addition, on a global scale there were 166 spills over 1000 barrels that occurred during offshore transport of oil in the period between 1974 and 2008, or one every 2.5 months (Anderson et al., 2012). The greatest risk to the marine environment comes from an uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons from the reservoir, known as a blowout (Johansen et al., 2003). Risk modeling suggests that an event the size of the Deepwater Horizon incident can be broadly predicted to occur on an interval between 8 and 91 years, or a rough average of once every 17 years (Eckle et al., 2012). Several major offshore oil blowouts have occurred, including the IXTOC-1 well in the Bahia de Campeche, Mexico where 3.5 million barrels of oil were released at a water depth of 50 m over 9 months (Jernelov and Linden, 1981; Sun et al., 2015) and the Ekofisk blowout where 200,000 barrels (32 million liters) of oil were released at a water depth of 70 m (Law, 1978). While all of these examples represent accidental discharges, the frequency at which they occur in offshore waters suggests that they can be expected during “typical” operations.

The best-studied example of a major deep-sea blowout was at the Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 (Jaye et al., 2016). This blowout discharged ~5 million barrels (800 million liters) of oil at a water depth of ~1500 m (McNutt et al., 2012). About half of the oil traveled up to the surface, while the rest of the gaseous hydrocarbons and oil suspended as microdroplets remained in a subsurface plume centered around 1100 m depth, that traveled ~50 km from the well-head (Camilli et al., 2010). The surface oil slicks interacted with planktonic communities and mineral particles to form an emulsion of oiled marine snow (Passow et al., 2012).

This material was subsequently observed as a deposited layer on the deep-sea floor that was detected in an area of ~3200 km² (Chanton et al., 2014; Valentine et al., 2014). Impacts at the seabed, as revealed by elevated hydrocarbon concentrations and changes to the nematode-c copepod ratio, were detected in an area of over 300 km², with patchy impacts observed to a radius of 45 km from the well site (Montagna et al., 2013; Baguley et al., 2015). This oiled marine snow was also implicated in impacts on mesophotic and deep-sea coral communities (White et al., 2012; Silva et al., 2015; Figure 2).

Deep-sea coral communities were contaminated by a layer of flocculent material that included oil fingerprinted to the Macondo well, and constituents of the chemical dispersant used in the response effort (White et al., 2012, 2014). Impacts on corals were detected at a number of sites, extending to 22 km from the well, and to water depths (1950 m) exceeding that of the well-head (Hsing et al., 2013; Fisher et al., 2014a).

Dispersants or chemical emulsifiers are applied to oil spills in an effort to disperse surface slicks. Globally, there have been over 200 documented instances of dispersant use between 1968 and 2007 (Steen, 2008). Dispersant use can cause increases in environmental hydrocarbon concentrations (Pace et al., 1995) and direct toxic effects (Epstein et al., 2000). Dispersants increase the surface area for oil-water interactions (Pace et al., 1995), ostensibly increasing the biological availability of oil compounds (Couillard et al., 2005; Schein et al., 2009), potentially enhancing toxic effects (Chandrasekar et al., 2006; Goodbody-Gringley et al., 2013; DeLeo et al., 2016). However, in the case of the Deepwater Horizon accident, dispersant use was shown to impede hydrocarbon degradation by microorganisms (Kleindienst et al., 2015). Chemically-dispersed oil is known to reduce larval settlement, cause abnormal development, and produce tissue degeneration in sessile invertebrates (Epstein et al., 2000; Goodbody-Gringley et al., 2013; DeLeo et al., 2016). Dispersant exposure alone has proved toxic to shallow-water coral larvae (Goodbody-Gringley et al., 2013) and deep-sea octocorals (DeLeo et al., 2016). Some of the potentially toxic components of dispersants may persist in the marine environment for years (White et al., 2014), but there are few in situ or even ex situ studies of effects of dispersants on deep-sea organisms.
Recovery from Impacts

Typical impacts from drilling may persist over long time scales (years to decades) in the deep sea. In deep waters, the generally low-energy hydrodynamic regime may lead to long-term persistence of discharged material, whether it be intentional or accidental (Neff, 2002; Chanton et al., 2014). Sediment contamination by hydrocarbons, particularly PAHs, is of particular concern, as these compounds can persist for decades, posing significant risk of prolonged ecotoxicological effects. Hydrocarbons from the Prestige spill, off the Galician coast, were still present in intertidal sediments 10 years post-spill (Bernabeu et al., 2013), and petroleum residues from the oil barge Florida were still detectable in salt marsh sediments in West Falmouth, MA, after 30 years (Reddy et al., 2002). In the Norwegian Sea (380 m depth), there was a reduction in the visible footprint of drill cuttings from a radius of over 50 m to ~20 m over 3 years, but chemical contamination persisted over the larger area (Gates and Jones, 2012). In the Faroe-Shetland Channel (500–600 m), visible drill cuttings reduced from a radius of over 85–35 m over a 3-year period, while an adjacent 10 year-old well-site exhibited visually distinct cuttings piles at a radius of only 15–20 m (Jones et al., 2012a). Recovery of benthic habitats may take longer at sites where bottom water movements limit dispersal of cuttings (Breuer et al., 2004).

Much of the deep-sea floor is characterized by comparatively low temperatures and low food supply rates. Consequently, deep-sea communities and individuals generally exhibit a slower pace of life than their shallow-water counterparts (reviewed in Gage and Tyler, 1991; McClain and Schlacher, 2015). Deep-water corals and cold-seep communities (Figure 2) represent anomalous high-biomass ecosystems in the deep sea and frequently occur in areas of economic interest because of their direct (energy and carbon source) or indirect (substratum in the form of authigenic carbonate) association with oil and/or gas-rich fluids (Masson et al., 2003; Coleman et al., 2005; Schroeder et al., 2005; Cordes et al., 2008; Bernardino et al., 2012; Jones et al., 2014). Cold-seep tubeworms and deep-water corals exhibit slow growth and some of the greatest longevities among marine metazoans, typically decades to hundreds of years, but occasionally to thousands of years (Fisher et al., 1997; Bergquist et al., 2000; Andrews et al., 2002; Roark et al., 2006; Cordes et al., 2007; Watling et al., 2011). Recruitment and colonization dynamics are not well-understood for these assemblages, but recruitment appears to be slow and episodic in cold-seep tubeworms (Cordes et al., 2003), mussels (Arellano and Young, 2009), and deep-sea corals (Thresher et al., 2011; Lacharité and Metaxas, 2013; Doughty et al., 2014).

Because of the combination of slow growth, long life spans and variable recruitment, recovery from impacts can be prolonged. Based on presumed slow recolonization rates of uncontaminated deep-sea sediments (Grassle, 1977), low environmental temperatures, and consequently reduced metabolic rates (Baguley et al., 2008; Rowe and Kennicutt, 2008), Montagna et al. (2013) suggested recovery of the soft-sediment benthos from the Deepwater Horizon well blowout might take decades. For deep-sea corals, recovery time estimates are on the order of centuries to millennia (Fisher et al., 2014b). However, in some cases re-colonization may be relatively rapid, for example, significant macrofaunal recruitment on cuttings piles after 6 months (Trannum et al., 2011). Altered benthic species composition may, nevertheless, persist for years to decades (Netto et al., 2009). Direct studies of recovery from drilling in deep water are lacking and the cumulative effects of multiple drilling wells are not well-studied.

**Assessment of Environmental Impacts**

Environmental impacts of oil and gas operations may influence species, populations, assemblages, or ecosystems by modifying a variety of ecological parameters (e.g., biodiversity, biomass, productivity, etc.). At the project level, potential impacts are generally assessed through some type of formal process, termed an environmental impact assessment (EIA). These typically involve the identification, prediction, evaluation, and mitigation of impacts prior to the start of a project. Key standard components of an EIA include: (i) description of the proposed development, including information about the size, location, and duration of the project; (ii) baseline description of the environment; (iii) description of potential impacts on
the environment, (iv) proposed mitigation of impacts, and (v) identification of knowledge gaps. Mitigation in current oil and gas projects is recommended to follow the mitigation hierarchy: avoid, minimize, restore, and offset (World Bank, 2012). Environmental management strategies, particularly those to avoid and minimize the environmental impacts of projects, are set during the EIA process and may become conditions of operation. As a result, this element of the EIA process is particularly important in preemptively avoiding serious impacts to the marine environment (Beanlands and Duinker, 1984). Establishing appropriate baseline data and control reference sites are critical to both an effective EIA development and subsequent assessment and monitoring of EIA predictions.

EIAs include predictions of how an ecological “baseline” condition may change in response to development and activities. The reliability of EIA predictions depends largely on the quality of existing ecological data (e.g., spatial and temporal coverage, measures of natural variation, taxonomic resolution, types of fauna observed, and collected, etc.) and empirical data or model predictions of how ecological features react to human stressors. Even in the best-known deep-sea environments, the need for planned, coherent, and consistent ecological data to inform EIAs may necessitate substantial new survey operations. For example, in the Gulf of Mexico, region-wide assessments of deep-sea community structure are available for different groups of fauna (e.g., Rowe and Menzel, 1971; Cordes et al., 2006, 2008; Rowe and Kennicutt, 2008; Demopoulos et al., 2014; Quattrini et al., 2014). However, following the Deepwater Horizon incident, baseline data were still found to be lacking in the immediate vicinity of the impacts, and for many key components of the ecosystem, including microbial communities and processes (Joye et al., 2016).

Testing EIA predictions and the effectiveness of implemented mitigation measures with well-designed and consistent environmental monitoring is a critical next step. Generally, some form of “before-after/control-impact” (BACI) monitoring approach is appropriate (Underwood, 1994), as this will enable the detection of accidental impacts in addition to impacts anticipated from typical operations (Wiens and Parker, 1995; Iversen et al., 2011). However, this often receives less attention and resources than the EIA itself, and most jurisdictions have minimal requirements for monitoring programs. Long-term monitoring in the deep sea is generally rare (e.g., Hartman et al., 2012), and long-term environmental monitoring of deep-water oil and gas developments is extremely limited. A significant exception is found in the two observatory systems that were installed in deep waters off Angola to record long-term natural and anthropogenic changes in the physical, chemical, and biological environment and to allow an understanding of the pace of recovery from unforeseen impacts (Vardaro et al., 2013). Monitoring should also be carried out after production has ceased and throughout de-commissioning.

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Volume 32 Number 4 Renewable Resources Journal 19
Western States Conservation Scorecard: An Analysis of Lands and Energy Policy Across the West

Center for Western Priorities

Introduction

Public lands are what make the American West the American West. They are the backbones of our local economies, living artifacts of our history, and the places that ground us. Public lands are managed by state, local, and the federal governments on behalf of the American public. While the U.S. government manages the vast majority of public lands—including national parks, monuments, forests, and wildlife refuges—state policies directly impact the health and accessibility of public lands and the local communities that rely on them.

The Center for Western Priorities developed a Western States Conservation Scorecard to evaluate state policies in eight Western states—Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming—placing a score on each state’s commitment to protecting and enhancing public lands in three key areas: lands and access, outdoor recreation, and responsible energy development. The goal of the scorecard is to illuminate best practices and gaps in state-level public lands-related policy in the West. This excerpt from the original report features responsible energy development issues.

States are in the unique position to help build a culture and economy that protects and enhances America’s public lands: state energy regulations safeguard air and water, state-level offices of outdoor recreation encourage the growth of outdoor business, and state wildlife conservation efforts protect wildlife from development. Effective state policies and regulations are replicated by other states and the federal government. Two years after Colorado passed a rule limiting methane waste from oil and gas operations, the Bureau of Land Management authored its own set of rules based on Colorado’s model. After Utah and Colorado opened offices of outdoor recreation, Montana followed suit.

No one state does everything perfectly, and not every solution works for every state, but what is clear is that Western states have a lot to offer and learn from one another.

Responsible Energy Development

Oil and gas extraction has long impacted the American West with economic booms and busts, spills, water contamination, air pollution, and habitat fragmentation. Energy production continues to be a major presence in the region, with Wyoming, New Mexico, and Colorado all listed among the top ten producing states of crude oil in the nation. Even though the types and quantity of energy production vary from state-to-state, Western states should enact responsible and commonsense measures that reduce the impacts of energy development on our Western communities, public lands, water, and wildlife. Standards that protect public health and the environment can be established through statutes,
stipulations of permit conditions, and voluntary action. As technology and practices change and improve over time, rules and regulations can too. Every state has room for improvement and every state has its own set of energy challenges. This scorecard examines a sampling of state-level policies related to energy development.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANKING</th>
<th>BEST</th>
<th>AVERAGE</th>
<th>NEEDS IMPROVEMENT</th>
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<td></td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>NM, NV, UT, WY</td>
<td>AZ, ID, MT</td>
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</table>

**Benchmark: Setbacks from Oil and Gas**

Possible Points

- **2 points total**: Half-mile setback or greater
- **1 point total**: Less than half-mile setback
- **0 points**: No setback

Why is This Important?

Setbacks, or required distances between drilling sites and private residences, schools, and other development, keep disturbances associated with energy development—such as air and noise pollution—at a distance. Setbacks from local water wells are preventative measures to avoid water contamination. Across the West, state rules on setbacks vary significantly, including in distance and jurisdiction.

What are States Doing?

**Colorado’s** required setbacks vary from 1,000 feet from multi-occupancy buildings to 500 feet from residences.6  **Wyoming** maintains a setback of 500 feet.6 In 2016, **Idaho** decided to keep their setback requirement at 300 feet instead of raising it to 500 feet.7 **New Mexico** and **Utah** let counties determine setbacks, which range dramatically.8 9 **Arizona’s** setbacks vary from 150-1,000 feet.10 **Nevada** has a 300 foot setback rule for fracking wells, but none for conventional wells.31 **Montana** has no setback rules.

Scores

- **2 of 2 points**: none
- **1 of 2 points**: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming
- **0 points**: Montana

**Benchmark: Public Disclosure of Fracking Chemicals**

Possible Points

- **1 point**: Required, transparent reporting
- **1 point**: Limit on trade secret claims

Why is This Important?

Many chemicals are injected into the earth during oil and gas extraction. Though these mixes are often coveted and secret tools of the trade, requiring public disclosure of fracking chemicals encourages the use of less toxic fluids, and ensures accountability for their potentially harmful effects.
What are States Doing?

In 2010, Wyoming became the first state to require disclosure of fracking chemicals. Industry soon began voluntarily reporting chemicals on FracFocus, a registry established by the Ground Water Protection Council and the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission. In 2015, the federal government recommended all companies drilling on federal public lands use this tool.

Today, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, and Utah, require public reporting using FracFocus. In the case of Colorado, reporting is required 48 hours prior to hydraulically fracturing a well. Other states—like Montana and New Mexico—have their own systems of disclosing chemicals through their state agencies. Arizona has no fracking chemical disclosure rules and reporting through FracFocus is voluntary. Wyoming and Colorado have also taken measures to make it more difficult for trade secret claims to trump disclosure.

Scores

2 of 2 points: Colorado, Wyoming
1 of 2 points: Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah
0 points: Arizona

Benchmark: Spill Reporting & Transparency

Possible Points

1 point: Spill reporting requirements
1 point: Publicly-available online spill database

Why is This Important?

Spills are an ongoing reality of energy development. When spills do happen, it’s essential that states require producers to report them and for the state to transparently convey that information to the public. This data should be easily available online and easily accessible for the public to understand the impact of spills.

What are States Doing?

All Western states require oil and gas operators to report spills when they occur. Montana requires immediate reporting of spills by telephone and a written report in five days. Colorado’s Rule 906 requires spill reporting within the first 24 hours of discovery. Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming also require industry reporting within 24 hours. Nevada and Idaho have spill reporting hotlines.

Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah share spills data publicly in online databases.

Though Wyoming collects spills data, the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission does not publish the data online. Both the Wyoming and Nevada Departments of Environmental Quality post some data on certain spills online; however, their lists are not comprehensive. In 2015, the Montana Board of Oil and Gas Conservation began posting state spills data online in monthly increments, but the data is difficult to find.

Scores

2 of 2 points: Colorado, New Mexico, Utah
1 of 2 points: Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Wyoming
0 points: None
**Benchmark: Baseline Water Testing**

Possible Points

1 point: Testing before and after drilling
1 point: Testing within a half-mile radius of wells

Why is This Important?

Baseline water testing at oil and gas sites is important for protecting groundwater from contamination, for protecting nearby communities, and for determining the source of contamination. Requiring water testing before and after drilling across a broad area can provide key data and ensure contamination is detected and addressed.

What are States Doing?

States vary in how large a radius they require companies to take water samples in, as well as how many water wells they require companies to sample within that radius. **Colorado, Wyoming, and Nevada** require pre-drill testing and two rounds of post-drill testing at four locations within a half-mile of the oil and gas well.33,34,35 **The Utah Geological Survey** conducted comprehensive baseline water quality in Utah’s productive Uinta Basin, but no where else in the state.36 In **New Mexico**, some industry groups have urged companies to voluntarily conduct baseline testing, without success.37

Scores

2 of 2 points: Colorado, Nevada, Wyoming
1 of 2 points: Utah
0 points: Arizona, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico

**Benchmark: Methane Emission Reduction**

Possible Points

2 points: Statewide methane capture rules

Why is This Important?

In 2012, it was estimated that nearly a quarter of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions come from oil, gas, and coal development on public lands.38 Methane, in particular, is a potent greenhouse gas that also contributes to ozone formation. Methane capture technology not only keeps harmful methane from entering the atmosphere, but generates another source of energy, while saving taxpayer resources.

What are States Doing?

**Colorado** is best known for its statewide methane waste rules, which inspired similar regulations at the federal level.39 Colorado’s landmark rules require oil and gas operators to to capture methane and prevent leaks. No other Western states have adopted similar methane capture rules.

However, several states have made strides to limit emissions of ozone precursors from oil and gas operations. For example, with the help of the Upper Green River Valley Ozone Task Force, **Wyoming** created local Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR) requirements for the region, after ongoing noncompliance with EPA ozone levels related to natural gas development.40 Similarly, in 2014, **Utah** enacted rules to reduce certain emissions from oil and gas operations.41
Scores

2 of 2 points: Colorado
0 points: Arizona, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming

Benchmark: Well & Mine Bonding

Possible Points

1 point: Strong bonding requirements for oil and gas wells
1 point: Prohibition against self-bonding for coal operations

Why is This Important?

Wells and mines that aren’t retired properly can be potential sources of methane—a highly explosive gas—and water contamination. When an operator abandons a well or mine, responsibility for reclamation often falls to the state and taxpayers. Bonding acts like an insurance policy for the state, a backup for contamination or abandonment. Unfortunately, most state bonding requirements are not sufficient to address the real cost of adequately closing wells and mines—meaning wells and mines often go unreclaimed for long periods of time, posing a greater risk of contamination. Most Western states allow companies to pay “blanket bonds,” essentially one price covering multiple wells. Many blanket bond levels are quite low, providing insufficient funds for reclamation. Another type of policy, found more frequently in coal operations, is “self-bonding,” in which companies promise to pay future cleanup costs based on their own financial strength. Self-bonding becomes essentially meaningless when a company goes bankrupt, leaving cleanup efforts to the state, and ultimately the taxpayer.

What are States Doing?

All Western states allow some form of blanket bonding for oil and gas wells. While those blanket bonding levels vary significantly, none are strong enough to adequately cover reclamation needs. Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming allow varying levels of self-bonding for coal mines, pursuant to financial viability requirements. Montana is the only state that explicitly does not allow self-bonding for coal operations.

Scores

2 of 2 points: None
1 of 2 points: Montana
0 points: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming

Benchmark: Fair Taxpayer Return

Possible Points

1 point: Royalty rates above federal rate (12.5%)
1 point: Have severance tax
1 point: Have conservation tax

Why is This Important?

Oil and natural gas production can be important sources of public revenue, and it is critical that taxpayers receive a fair return for energy produced on public lands. There are three main taxes on energy extraction that ensure taxpayers get a fair share: severance taxes, royalty rates, and conservation levies. Severance taxes, or
taxes charged to producers for extracting nonrenewable resources, get redistributed back to the states to offset costs associated with production impacts, like road maintenance and environmental protections. States also receive royalty payments based on the market value of the resources extracted from state owned lands. Conservation taxes are intended specifically for redirection into conservation and remediation programs.

What are States Doing?

Many Western states have royalty rates that exceed the federal royalty rate of 12.5 percent. Arizona and Idaho have royalty rates that match the federal rate of 12.5 percent, which the Government Accountability Office has said does not optimize revenue to provide a fair return for taxpayers. Nevada does not have a state royalty rate. Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah all require an oil and gas conservation tax or levy and a severance tax, while Arizona, Idaho, and Wyoming charge a severance tax, but no conservation tax. Montana and Nevada charge a conservation tax or levy, but no severance tax.

3 of 3 points: Colorado, New Mexico, Utah
2 of 3 points: Montana, Wyoming
0 points: Arizona, Idaho, Nevada

Conclusion

Spectacular landscapes and outdoor lifestyles are the calling card of the American West. Along with federal and local governments, Western states have and should continue to improve laws to protect our lands, provide recreation access and funding for stewardship, and mitigate the impacts of energy. As laboratories of democracy, improved and strengthened state policies can spread across the region and throughout the nation, strengthening our conservation legacy. With strong policies in place, Western states can ensure our remarkable lands, water, and wildlife are there for the enjoyment generations to come.
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<th>Benchmark</th>
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Literature Cited


48. Appendix, Table 8
Announcements

American Water Resources Association

2018 Annual Conference
November 4 - 8, 2018. Baltimore, MD

This conference will convene water resource professionals and students from throughout the nation and will provide attendees the opportunity to learn about and engage in multi-disciplinary water resource discussions. The program will stimulate conversations on water resource management, research and education. The 2018 conference will also include locally relevant topics such as the Chesapeake Bay, the Delaware River watershed, and eastern water law as well as globally significant issues such as coastal resilience, fire effects on watersheds, communication and outreach strategies and integrated water resources.

American Meteorological Society

AMS 29th Conference on Severe Local Storms
October 22 - 16, 2018. Stowe, VT

This conference will feature experts on topics related to severe local storms and associated hazards of tornadoes, large hail, damaging winds, lightning, and flash floods.

AMS 99th AMS Annual Meeting
January 6 - 10, 2019. Phoenix, AZ
https://annual.ametsoc.org/2019

Join fellow scientists, educators, students, and other professionals from across the weather, water, and climate community in Phoenix, Arizona from 6–10 January, 2019 to share, learn, and collaborate. This year’s theme is “Understanding and Building Resilience to Extreme Events by Being Interdisciplinary, International, and Inclusive (III).”

Geological Society of America

Annual Meeting & Exposition
November 4 - 7, 2018. Indianapolis, IN
http://community.geosociety.org/gsa2018/home

This annual meeting will highlight Indiana area geology as well as the wider world of geoscience research.
American Society of Civil Engineers

2018 Convention
http://2018.asceconvention.org/

The ASCE Convention is the Society flagship membership event. The program for the Convention will be of an integrated, cross-cultural, technical, and educational nature. The following issues will be discussed: state of the industry and profession; professional development; multi-disciplinary technical, natural and man-made disasters; strategic issues/public policy; significant projects; and history and heritage.

Society of Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry

2018 Asia-Pacific Conference
September 16 - 19, 2018. Daegu, South Korea
http://setac-ap2018.org/

This conference is dedicated to provide highly scientific programs as well as stimulating discussion under the main theme “Data, Science, and Management Promoting Environmental Welfare.” In Daegu, experts from different fields of academia, business, and regulatory communities and large student community will take a part of the conference to provide a multidisciplinary and comprehensive overview of the latest researches with advanced solutions to environmental challenges.

North America Annual Conference
November 4 - 8, 2018. Sacramento, CA
https://sacramento.setac.org/

This meeting will explore the link between sustainable economic development and environmental stewardship, with particular focus on ecological and societal considerations. In this context, stewardship represents the practice of transforming sustainable thinking into action. However, we are challenged to decouple the historical connection between economic growth and ecological integrity, and the resultant societal effects. This meeting offers opportunities to feature the connections between desired ecosystem goods and services, stable flourishing societies and sustainable economies.

American Society for Landscape Architects

2018 Annual Meeting
https://www.asla.org/annualmeetingandexpo.aspx

The ASLA annual meeting will feature a diverse spectrum of industry experts providing perspectives on a wide range of subjects, from sustainable design to active living to best practices and new technologies. More than 130 education sessions, field sessions and workshops will be presented during the meeting.
American Geophysical Union

Fall Meeting
December 10 - 14, 2018 Washington, DC
https://fallmeeting.agu.org/2018/

The AGU 2018 Fall Meeting provides an opportunity to share science with world leaders in Washington, D.C. As the largest Earth and space science gathering in the world, the Fall Meeting places participants in the center of a global community of scientists drawn from myriad fields of study whose work protects the health and welfare of people worldwide, spurs innovation, and informs decisions that are critical to the sustainability of the Earth.

Geoscience and Society Summit
March 18 - 21, 2019. Stockholm, Sweden
https://connect.agu.org/gss/home

The Summit aims to create a highly interactive forum for effective cooperation between scientists and users of scientific information to tackle global and local challenges around sustainability of natural resources and systems, global health, and resilience.
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